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Case No. 8233
IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARY RAMIREZ,

Appellanti

OGDEN CITYv a municipal
corporation of the
State of Utah,
Respondento

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal is taken from a judgment of dismissal
of appellant 0 s amended complaint with prejudice by the
lower court (Tr. 038).

The issues were determined by

the trial court at a pre-trial

conference~.

Thereafter

at the time of trial certain facts were stipulated to
be true and contentions of the parties discussed and
settled.

Thereupon the cause was submitted to the
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Court upon the pre-trial order (Tr. 030) and upon
stipulated facts (Tr. 043) and upon the respondent's
answers to appellant's interrogatories (Tr. 014).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Agreed facts, as stated in numbered paragraphs in
the pre-trial order
1.

are as follows:

That the Respondent is a municipal corpora-

tion of the State of Ut'ah.
2.

That Ogden City owns the land upon which is

located the premises wherein the appellant was injured.
3.

That on the eighth day of March, 1952, at

approximately nine o'clock p.m., the appellant
attended a social function being held in the Community
Center, which is the property owned by Og-den City mentioned in 2 above.
4.

That while in the ladies 5 powder room of the

Community Center. Building, the appellant's dress
brushed against an unprotected gas spa.ce heater and
caught fire, inflicting injuries upon her person.
5.

That on at least three occasions ,prior to

March 8, 1952w other groups had had access to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Community Center Building and had paid to the director
a sum of money for the use thereofo
6.

That the appellant is obligated to Doctor

Grua, a medical doctor, in the sum of $500.00 for
services rendered her in treating her for injuries
which she received and about which she complains in
this action and that said sum is a reasonable sum for
the services rendered.
7.

That the appellant obligated herself to pay

to the Dee Hospital the sum of $150.00 for blood
transfusions furnished her in the necessary care and
treatment of her as a result of injuries she received
and about which she complains in this action.
8.

That

pre~trial

Exhibit 1 is a correct summary

of the disbursements, salaries, operating expensesv
repairs, maintenance, and revenues as shown by the
books and records of the Director of Finance of Ogden
City for the years 1948 to and including 1953.
9.

That on March 8, 1952, the Havana Club held

a function in the Conununi ty Cen.ter Building and paid
to the director thereof the sum of fifteen dollars,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and that said Havana Club charged those who participated in a dance which they were sponsoring seventyfive cents per person.
10.

That ·pre-trial Exhibit 2 is a photograph of

the gas heater against which appellant's clothing was
ignited and of which she complains in this lawsuit.
11.

That Mrs. Buelah Jones was at the time of

injuries complained of herein the director of the
Community Center Building and was in the employ of the
respondent and that her duties were to direct recreational activity at the Community Center Building.
12.

That from on and about September 1, 1946, to

May 1, 1952, the Community Center Building was under
the general management of a board of directors which
had been elected at open mass meeting of the members
of the public who had occasion to use said Community
Center Building and that all activities in connection
with that building were directed by that board; that
prior to March 8, 1952, and at all times material to
the matters involved in this lawsuit certain men
served at the invitation of Commissioner Thomas East
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as advisors to the board of directors elected as
aforesaid.
13.

That from September 3, 1946, to November 1,

1946, the snack bar and concession was rented by Ogden
City to a third party and charged therefor rental at
the rate of $101.00 per month; that thereafter the
concession and snack bar was rented to another person
at a rate of $50.00 per month and that the relationship as above set forth was terminated prior to the
year 1948.
14.

That appellant filed with the respondent

timely a claim in the amount of $75 0 000.00 and that
more than ninety days elapsed thereafter before the
filing of this suit.
15.

That all funds received by the director of

the Community Center Building were expended under the
direction of the board of directors elected as set
forth in 12 above.
Further facts 0 not disputed 0 are as follows:
The premises known as the Community Center came
to Ogden City by deed on October 4 0 1939. (lnterrogaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tory 1) •

Between that date and November 20, 1944,

barracks buildings were moved onto the premises and
there readied for occupancy.

On November 20, 1944,

Ogden City entered into a lease with the United Service Organization for the said premises for a period
from date until cessation of hostilities with Germany
plus six months, which period ended in the fall of
1946 (lnt. II)

o

In August 1946, Tom East, a city commissioner of
Ogden City 0 called a mass meeting of citizensv at
which meeting a board of directors was created by a
resolution of said citizens, and advisors to

assi~t

the board of directors were informally nominated by
Mro East, said commissioner of parks, to serve on a
voluntary basis (Into 12)

o

The commissioner of parks to Ogden City, Mr. East,
in calling said meeting and in appointing said
advisors, was "acting for himself alone without the
concurrence of the Ogd.en City Conunissjon". (Int. 5).
Said board fixed its own policy, was atonomous to
itselfo

It never received instructions nor directions
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from Ogden City concerning the manner in which it
operated said Center.
The premises were returned to Ogden City in the
fall of 1946.

Said board, created as above set out 0

had from September I, 1946, until after the accident
herein complained of, ''-the direct and active managemen to supervision 0 operation and control of said
Conununity Center".
Both under the lease with the United Service
Organization and its arrangement with said board of
directors~

Ogden City annually contributed money for

the maintenance and operation of said Community Center
(Int. 7 and 15) •
From the time thepremises were returned to Ogden
City by the United Service Organization in the fall of
1946 until after the time of the injury herei.n complained of, Franklin Richards, the Director of Parks
and Public Property for Ogden City 0 had charge of the
maintenance of said Community Center (Int. 6).
Beulah Jones became the director of said

Cpmmu~

nity Center on or about September 9 1951, and conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tinued thereafter as such director until after the
time of the injury herein complained of.

She received

her salary from Ogden City, but was under the direction and supervision of said board (Int. 6 &

7) •

On March 8, 1952 7 and on at least four _other
occasions the Havana Club, an organization of Spanish
speaking people 0 rented a portion of said Community
Center premises for the purpose of holding a dance.
On March 8th, 1952 0 and said four other occasionsv
said Havana Club paid to the director the sum of
$15v00 for the use of said premises 0 for which an
entry of "hall rental• was.made by the director in her
report to the said Ogden City (Exhibit

~.

The Havana Club charged those who participated in
the dance the sum of

seventy~five

cents per personv

which the appellant intended to pay upon entering the
portion of the building where the dance was held.

In

said Community Center there is but one ladies' rest
room, to which the appellant and her sister-in-law
went directly upon entering said Community Center
Building.
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The Exhibits 2 and 3 are a picture and diagram of
said premises.

While standing before a mirror the

appellant's dress brushed against the small defective
gas stove, situated in part underneath the only mdrror
in said rest room, and was ignited; and she suffered
the injuries complained of.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

Ao

That the trial court erred in dismissing
appellant's amended complaint with
prejudiceo

B.

That the judgment of dismissal was against
the facts and the lawo

Co

That the relationship of landlord and
tenant existed between the respondent
and the Havana Club at the time of
accident.

D.

That the respondent was engaged in a
proprietary function.

E.

Even though the operation of Community
Center was a governmental function in
g.eneral, it was proprietary as to
appellant at time and place and under
circumstances of appellant's injury.

ARGUMENT

It is appellant's contention:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1.

That a landlord-tenant relationship existed

at the time of the injury between the respondent Ogden
City Corporation and the Havana Club and that said
Havana Club was either a lessee directly from Ogden
City or a sub-lessee throngh the Board of Directors of
the Community Center.

That in either relationship

Ogden City is responsible to the Appellant as a landlord under the authority of
Lowe vs. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91,
44 P. 1050.
That case was an action for damages for personal
injuries.

The defendant rented a portion ·of t.he City

Hall to the Legislature as a legislative chamber ·for
holding its session in 1889, received rent for the use
thereof.

It was found that the Legislature was right-

fully there.

The defendant was the owner and occupant

of the premises at the time of the accident.

The

plaintiff was a member of the Legislature, and was
rightfully on the premises, attending a night session.
There was an outhouse in the rear of the premises.

It

was locked up with a key in some office in t,he building.

Plaintiff went out in the dark, there being no

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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light in the yard, got oft the pathway leading to the
outhouse and fell into an open hat-chway and was
injured.
tiffo

The jury returned a verdict for the plain-

Defendant conceded that the plaintiff had the

right to go to the outhouse but said he was restricted
to the pathway and when he turned off it he was a trespasser and could not recover.

The court held 0 among

other things, that the yard was appurtenant to the
hall, and 0 in the absense of any restrictions, the
members of the Legislature had a right to make a
proper use thereof; and that plaintiff's use was not
unlawfulo

In part the Court said:

tt'We think that the leaving of the hatchway in an unguarded and unprotected condition
by the defendant 9 as shown by the evidence 0
and the failure to have any light in the yard
by which its condition could be seen 0 was
such negligence as rendered it liable for
any injury which was caused thereby."
The Supreme Court of Idaho 0 in the case of
Pineock

VSo

McCoyQ 281 Po 371

distinguished that case from the Lowe case upon the
ground that the plaintiff in the Idaho case was a
police officer who was upon the premises in question
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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as a mere licensee.

In referring to the Lowe case,

supra, the Idaho Court said:
·~pecially commended to our attention by
appellant is the case of-Lowe vs. Salt Lake
City 13 U. 91, 44 P. 1050,-57 Am. -St;· Rep. 708,
an examination of which disc-loses that it.was
decided upon the principal of landlord and
tenantv not applicable here; the court stating
that the defendantv by invitation, induced
the respondent to come upon the premises,
knowing their dangerous condition and was
therefore liable for the injury." (Under~
scoring oursol

The rule laid down in the Lowe ease, supra, was
referred to with approval in the· case of
Lunt VSo Post Printing and Publishing Company 1
110 Po 203
in this language:

"* * * It will. be nO-ticed that. the rule
itself-, as announced in the case of Bennett
vs. Railroad Co., supras and in other cases
cited by plaintiff (Atlanta Cottonseed Oil
Mills vs. Coffee, 80 Ga. 145, 4 S.E. 759,
12 Am. St. Rep. 244; Beck vs. Carter, 68
N.Y. 283, 23 Am. Rep. 175; Lowe vs· .. Salt Lake
City 13 U. 91 9 44 P. 1050 9 57 Am. St~Repo
708;_ Learoyd; vs. Godfrey, 138 Mass.· -315;
Beehler vs. :-1Danie.ls 18 R.I. 563, -29 Atl. 6v
27 L.R.A. 512, 49 Am. St. Rep. 790; Hart vs.
Cole, 156 Mass. 475, 31 N.E. 644 9 16 L.R.A.
577) , bases t.he. qu_e.stion of rec.o.very
primarily upon the fact that an invitation,
express or implied, was given to the injured
partyv by which invitation he was induced,
or lead, or lured, or enticed by the defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ant upon the premises where the injury
occurred." (Underscoring ours.)
The Court distinguished the Lunt case from the Lowe
case, supra, in that the plaintiff Lunt was a fireman
who died from inhaling fumes in a building which was
on fire, the Court holding that the plaintiff was a
mere licensee.
The Lowe case, supra, was cited with approval in
the case of
Harris vs. City of Bremerton 147 P. 638
which was an action for personal injuries from falling
into an open space between the two floats constituting
a public municipal dock, in which the Supreme Court
of Washington held that the City's negligence was for
the jury, and this, notwithstanding the fact that the
plalntiff paid no fee for landing his launch at the
wharf.
The rule in the Lowe case was also recognized in
the case of
Burbidge vs.
211 P. 691

Ut~h

Light and Traction Co.

In the recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ln the case of
Davis vs. Provo City, 265 P. (2) 415
the Court analyzed the relationship between Provo CitYo
Brigham Young University and the plaintiff and referred
to Section 356 of the Restatement of Torts in the
following

lang~age:

"In the Restatement of Torts sec. 356,
the general concept in such circumstances is
sunnnarized:-· , 'Except as stated in secso 357~
362, a _lessor of land is not liable for
bodily harm caused to his lessee or others
upon the land with the consent of the lessee
or a sublessee by any dangerous condition
whether natural o:r artificial which existed
when the lessee took possession.' Further,
the lease may be created by words or other
conduct expres·sing consent to the lessee w s
possession5 Seco 355 (a) • The only
applicable exception listed i.s at sec. 395:
'A lessor who leases land for.a purpose
which involves the admission of a,,Jarge
number of persons as patrons of his lessee,
is subject to liability for bodily.harm
caused to them b an artificial condition
exist!ng when the essee took possession,
if the lessor <a> knew or should hav.e.. known
of the condition and realized orshould have
realized the unreasonable risk to them in~
volved therein, and (b) had reason.to·e?q?ect
that the lessee would admit his p-atrons - before the land was ut in reasonably safe
COn i tion .or their l'eee~tlOn e
hlS doctrine is applicable irrespective of
whether such person paLS lor his aamiSsion
or is admitted free of cbargeo sece 359
(c), and irrespective of whether the Jease
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is for rent or other valuable consideration
or is a free gift, Secv 359 (d) • " (Underscoring ours J
A like result was reached in
Worden vs. New Bedford 131 Mass. 23,
41 Am. Rep. 185.
Furthermore, it is apparent from the circumstances of this case that there was a tenancy at will
between Ogden City and the Board operating the Community Center.

As hereinafter statedw the United Service

Organization leased the premises from Ogden City; and
thereafter the Board which operated the Community
Cemer continued the same type of operation without a
formal leaseo

But whether or not the City had pre-

viously leased to the United Service Organization a
tenancy at will arose between the Board and the
fendant City.

de~

In
51 C.J.S. Section 159, 766

as to "mere permissive occupancy" the rule is stated:
"A permissive occupation of real estate 0
where no rent is reserved or paid and no time
is agreed on to limit the occupation, is a
tenancy at will."
In the same volume, at page 762, section 156, it is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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stated:
"The tenant at will is in possession by
right with the consent of the landlord either
express or implied. * * * His estate is a
leasehold."
(See note 15 where it is indicated that the
words "lease''-, "lessor", and "lessee• include
in appropriate instances tenancies at will
and parties to such tenancies.
CoiiDDonweal th- vs. Goldberg 64 N.E. (2) 438,
319 Masso 7 0 and eases therein cited.)
See

2o

Thompson on Real Property 0 Volume 3,
page 14, Section 1022.
That the respondent- Ogden Ci-ty was engaged in

a proprietary function at the Community Center at the
time and place in question for the following reasons:
a.

Ogden City has never assumed control over

said premises from the time it came into existence.
b.

That the functions of said Community Center

were under the direct control of the United Service
Organization while leased to them and thereafter-under
the control of the Board of Directors mentioned above.
e.

A leasing of sa-i-d premises to the United

Service Organization was a proprietary function and
the same lack of governmental control is evidenced in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the arrangement with the Board.

That Ogden City did

not consider the operation of the Community Center as
a governmental function is borne out by the fact that
it did not assume responsibility for operating said
Center and did not legally delegate such responsibility even if it could do so.

Article I of the Ogden

City Charter provides in part as follows:
"All powers of the City shall be exercised
as prescribed by this Charter 1 or if not herein
prescribed~ then as prescribed by ordinance."
We have made a search and have been unable to find any
ordinance relating to the operation of the Community
Center by the City.

That such is the case is also

borne out by the answers to the interrogatories on
file herein.
While it is true that a so-called Board of Directors was set up as previously outlined herein, this
Board was not acting as an arm of the City or under
any expressed power derived therefrom.

The limit of

the power to legally create such a Board is set out in
37 Am. Jur., page 667, et seq.
See also

Delegation by Municipality, 37 Am.
Jur. 0 page 732.
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As concisely put in
McQuillan on Municipal Corporations
Volume lv Section 382:
"Therefore the principle is fundamental
and of universal application. The public
powers conferred upon a municipal corporation
and its officers and agents cannot be
surrendered or delegated to others."
The City's contention

th~

operation of the Center was

a governmental function is at variance with the rule
prohibiting the delegation of authority and the facts
in this case.

Ifv therefore, the City could not

dele~

gate the power certainly Commissioner East could not
have done so.
3.

Even if the operation of the

so~called

Commu=

nity Center were held to be a governmental function in
general 0 the function became and was proprietary as to
the appellant at the time and place and under the

cir~

cumstances of appellant's injury.
That the City may be engaged in a governmental
and proprietary activity at the same time and place is
borne out by the following case:
Rhodes vs. City of Palo Alto 223 P.(2) 639.
In that case the Community Center was situated in a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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public park 0 included a theatre 0 soft ball park 0 play
ground and other facilities.

The parking lot was

available to any of the persons using the facilities.
The plaintiff drove to the parking lot to park her caro

',i!'[' j
~ -~

r~

she walked toward the auditorium 0 stepped into a hole
in the paveme-nt 0 causing her to fall 9 resulting in the
injuries sued for.
Defendant claimed

(1)

that the community theatre

and parking lot were governmental functions because
they benefitted the public welfare;

(~

that the

operation of the parking lot was a governmental
function even if the operation of the community
theatre was a proprietary one; (3) also that the
community theatre was donated by a philanthropist who
expressed the expectation that it would advance the
interests of adults in recreation activities; and (4)
that the theatre was administered by the City
recreation department.
conditions

The court in analyzing these

stated (page 642):

"Trueo it was maintained for the
of the community in the sense that it
the populace a meeting place for many
of amusement and instruction. But in

benefit
afforded
forms
all
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these respects it differed no whit from any
other auditorium or assembly hall built and
maintained by private capital for the same
purposeso '".
The

verdict~for

t.be plaintiff was affirmed.

Two cases cited in the Rhodes case, suprav were:
Chafor vs. City of Long Beach 163 P. 670
Sanders vs. City of Long Beach 129 P.(2) 511.
The Chafor case was decided prior to the enactment of
the Pu,blic Liability Act of Californiaq but that act
was not a factor in the decision reached in any one of
the three cases cited above.
A like holding is found in
Engles vs. City of New York, 6 N.Y. Supp. 2nd,
page 436
where an action was brought against the municipality
for injuries sustained by the plaintiff on alighting
from an elevator to visit a pay patient in the hospitM.
The verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed on appealv
the Court pointing out that although the operation of
Kings County Hospital was certainly a governmental
function costing the City about three million dollars
while receipts were slightly over one hundred thousand
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dollars 9 the City, while furnishing hospitalization to
plaintiff's sister, was engaged in an enterprise for
gain and as a consequence thereof owed certain duties
to the patient and her visitors.

The jury found among

other facts that plaintiff sustained her injury while
visiting her sister who was paying for the service,
that as to that patient the hospital was being conducted for profit and that at the time of the accident
so far as plaintiff was concerned the City was not
rendering a public or governmental service but was
exercising its proprietary or corporate powers and
said at page 438:
·~o one will contend that if a city conducts an activity for profit, that it js performing a governmental function. That the
city enjoys both powers - proprietary or
private and governmental or public. It may
exercise those two powers under the same
roof - at one institution."

An analysis of the several Utah cases brought

against the municipal corporations reveals that in all
of the cases where the rulings were adverse to the
plaintiffs, the city was engaged in its usual governmental functions such as enforcing police regulations 0
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preventing crime, preserving public health, preventing
fires, etc.

In the two cases in which rulings were

found in favor of the plaintiffs
Burton "vs. Salt Lake City, 253 P. 443
Griffin vs. Salt Lake City, 176 P.(2) 156
the existence of other facts lead the Court to the
conclusion that the municipality in those cases was
engaged in proprietary functions.

The appellant con-

tends that the facts in the present case are readily
distinguishable from all of the other Utah cases and
within the scope of the Griffin case, supra.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the Court erred in
dismissing appellant's amended complaint with prejudice, and that the cause should be remanded to the
lower court for trial under appropriate instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
WALLACE, ADAMS & PETERSON
Attorneys for Appellant
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